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worth only $2000. Under the suggested construction, the property
would be held to be worth $2000, but the insured, who insured only his
interest therein, would recover $667, the actual value of his interest.
This would seem to be more consistent with both the purpose of the
statute, and the principle of indemnity upon which insurance is based.
P.E.S.
INSURANCE - SUBROGATION OF INSURANCE CO. TO
CLAIMS AGAINST THE TORT FEASOR
In many kinds of insurance a company which has paid a claim un-
der the policy may maintain an action against the tort feasor who was
responsible for the loss. While the policy often expressly provides for
subrogation, the right exists without a contract and is said to be based
upon dictates of equity and conscience.' Among those policies which
provide for subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, in-
cluding those in the form of the New York standard, the insured's rights
must be measured solely on the terms of such provisions.2 Subrogation
is a basic doctrine of suretyship and its extension to insurance was founded
on the principle that insurance is a contract of indemnity.' Conse-
quently the rationale of the courts in determining whether such a right
exists is to tag a particular type of insurance indemnity, or non-indem-
nity protection. Hence it has been applied without question to fire insur-
ance.4 Since the right of subrogation grows out of the principle of
indemnity, it follows that the insurer is not entitled to subrogation until
he has paid the insured's claim or until the insured has been fully indem-
nified for his loss. The recent Ohio case of McConnell v. Conway'
concluded, "an insurer, having paid the amount of a policy issued on a
building destroyed by an incendiary, will not be subrogated to the claim
of the insured against the wrongdoer, unless and until the insured has
been indemnified fully for his loss." This is illustrative of the court's
reliance upon the relation of subrogation to indemnity and its use as a
vehicle for problems arising under this doctrine.6 Although there have
'Am. Central Ins. Co. v. Weller, xo6 Or. 494, zz Pac. 803 (1923).
'Home Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, iz8 Miss. 28z2, 90 So. 1 (192z)5 Williams & Miller
Gin Co. v. Baker Cotton Oil Co., so8 Okla. IZ7, z35 Pac. 18S (i925).
'Newcomb v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., zz Ohio St. 382, zo Am. Rep. 736 (1872); Phenix
Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 134. Ind. 2x5, 20 L.R.A. 405 , 33 N.E. 970 (1892);
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, (935) P. 119.
'Baltimore Am. Underwriters of Baltimore Am. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Beckley, 195 Atl.
550 (Md., 1937); Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc. v. Stang, IS Ohio C.C. 464, 9 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 576 (897); Sun Oil Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., I. Ohio Cir. Ct. 355, 8 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 145 (5898).
62 Ohio App. 335, 23 N.E. (zd) 970, I5 Ohio Op. 508 (5939).
'Svea Assur. Co. v. Packham, 9z Md. 464, 48 Atl. 35, 52 L.R.A. 9S (i9o).
been various other theories advanced explaining subrogation, the courts
have favored this justification and as a consequence deny this right when
no loss would have fallen on the insured, although the insurer has paid.'
It follows that if the loss is not covered by the policy or falls within an
exception the insurer cannot recover on the basis of subrogation.'
Subrogation will be applied in all forms of fidelity insurance. If the
company agrees to reimburse an employer for defalcations by employees,
it may, of course, maintain a claim against the wrongdoer." In fact,
these surety bond cases offer one of the clearest illustrations for applying
this equitable doctrine. Likewise, the principle will be applied in burglary
and theft insurance; since the type of insurance and not the article in-
volved determines the question, an insurance company which has insured
an automobile against theft (and fire) may maintain an action against
the party responsible for the loss.
Life insurance, with a basic difference in organization, has generally
been construed to be of the non-indemnity variety and it follows that the
principle of subrogation has not been applied." It should be noted, how-
ever, that life insurance is not entirely free of indemnity features; the
payment of a sum of money, to make up to some extent for the loss of
income upon the death of the bread winner, is not unlike indemnity.
Nevertheless, it is often said that life insurance is more in the nature
of an investment,' " and courts have taken notice of the fact that if the
insured lives out his expectancy the amount paid in premiums and accu-
mulated interest thereon will be greater than that returned to the bene-
ficiary." Furthermore, in most branches of insurance the event insured
against is contingent, whereas in life insurance death is certain and only
the time is uncertain. Among certain authorities 4 and in some states,"
'VANCE, INSURANCE (zd ed.) p. 68i is of the opinion that the basis of the carrier's
action is not subrogation but directly the negligence of the third party---since loss to insur-
ance company was forseeable.
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 8 S.Ct. 6zS (1887); McKinnon v.
A. Y. Assets Realization Co., 217 Fed. 339, 133 C.C.A. z55 (1914).
' Scandinavian, etc., Ins. Co. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., Ioo4 Neb. z58 (19zo).
'"Huff v. Rosen, 1zi Misc. 674, zoi N.Y.S. 689 (1923). The insurance company is
not subrogated to the employer's rights, however, until it has actually paid the loss, Am.
Sur. Co. v. Palmer, z4o N.Y. 63, 147 N.E. 359 (192).
'Dalby v. India & London Assor. Co., IS C.B. 365, 139 Eng. Rep. 465 (1854).
' Gateceiller v. Milwaukee Electric Co., 136 Wis. 34, s16 N.W. 633 (1909); Scott
v. Dixon, 6o8 Pa. 6, 56 Am. Rep. 19z (1884).
'MACLEAN LIFE INS. (Sth ed., 1939), p. 101 et seq., p. 59 et seq., where it is
demonstrated that payment of premiums plus interest on premiums total a greater sum than
benefit or cash surrender value.
" RICHARDS, INS. LAW (3 d Ed., 1912), p. Iz4 states that life insurance is a contract
of indemnity; the amount always being fixed in advance.
'5PATTERsoN, EsSENTIALS OF INS. LAw, (1935) p. s32-"in Texas a life insurance
contract is treated for some purposes as a contract of indemnity. In a few other states,
Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, one finds traces of the
indemnity theory."
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one finds traces of the indemnity theory applied to life insurance, but
not even in these states has subrogation been granted.
Much the same reasoning leads the courts to deny subrogation to
the insurer against personal injury or death by violent and accidental
means, i.e. accident insurance.' 6 In Mercer Casualty Co. v. Perlman,'
the Ohio Court found that "the insurer in a policy of accident insurance
which contains no provision for subrogation of the insurer, having paid a
loss by reason of accidental injuries to the insured, is not subrogated to
the rights of the insured to claim damages from a third person whose
negligence caused the injuries." While it is probably true that in prac-
tice the indemnity features of the accident insurance contract are more
significant than in life insurance, the amount payable by the insurer is
fixed by the terms of the contract and not by an assessment of the actual
loss suffered and as a consequence the denial of subrogation to an acci-
dent insurer has seldom been questioned.'
Workmen's Compensation Acts generally provide subrogation rights
for the insurance carrier against third persons liable for the injury suf-
fered.' 9 Even in the absence of such a provision in the Act, the courts,
as a whole, have given the carrier similar rights.2 0 A Texas court in
Texas Employer's Liability Act failed to provide for subrogation; by
virtue of the Revised Statute of 1925, Article 8307, a compensated
insurer is subrogated to the rights of an injured employee against any
third person.2" One court in an action involving the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act held that the policy effected by employers protecting
themselves against loss arising out of or resulting from injuries to its
employees, in the course of their employment, to be of the nature of an
accident insurance policy and stated that unless the policy is made ex-
pressly an indemnity contract the insurer is not subrogated to the rights
of the insured.2 However, the weight of authority leaves little doubt
that a contractual provision is not necessary to vest this right.
24
"Sutles v. Railway Mail Ass'n., 156 App. Div. 435, 141 N.Y.S. 1042 (1913);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 5zI, 72 S.W. 6z (19oz).
'6z Ohio App. 133, 23 N.E. (zd) 502 (939).
" Independent Eastern Torpedo Co. v. Harrington, 95 S.W. (2d) 377, (Texas, 1936).
'
0 Dahn. v. Hines, 254 U.S. 627, 41 S.Ct. 147, 65 L.Ed. 446 (5 U.S.C.A. para. 751
et seq., 19z); Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Term. Rys., 39 Cal. App.
388, 178 Pac. 974- (1919) (California Workman's Compensation Act, 1913, para. 31);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., Z39 N.Y. Z73, 146 N.E. 377, 29 A.L.R. 8z6
(19zS) (N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law, para. 29); Sec. 2 Schneider, Workmen's
Compensation Law (1939), para. 466, p. z189.
' Travelers Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Co., 184 Fed. 426, 107 C.C.A. 20 (1911).
19182 was unable to find any basis for extending the right when the
I' City of Austin v. Johnson, 204 S.W. I1S1 (Texas, 1918).
'Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Texas Power and Light Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 782
(Texas, 1931).
'Marshall-Jackson Co. v. Jeffrey, 167 Wis. 63, x66 N.W. 647 (igi8).
"Busch & L. Painting Co. v. Noerman Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 614
Besides fire and theft insurance, as heretofore mentioned, the com-
mon types of automobile insurance are liability, property damage, and
collision. Liability and property damage may be distinguished with re-
gard to the losses for which they purport to indemnify the insured; lia-
bility covering damage to the person of another, while property damage
covers damage to the property of another.2 5 In each type of policy, the
company promises only to indemnify the insured and it need pay no
damages for injury to the third party unless the insured was at fault26
Hence there is little need for any doctrine of subrogation here; if the
insured is not at fault the company will pay nothing; if the insured is
at fault neither he nor his company is likely to have a claim against
another.
In collision insurance, the company agrees to indemnify the insured
for damage to his own car. Here subrogation applies; if a company has
paid the amount of the damage, and the wrongful act of a third party
was the cause of the loss, an action may be maintained against this tort
feasor."7 Collision insurance, damage to one's own car, may be com-
pared to accident insurance, damage to one's person, since it involves
benefits to the assured with or without a causal relation raising a liabil-
ity to be indemnified; despite this similarity, subrogation has not been
allowed in accident insurance.
In A'lercer Casualty Co. v. Perlman,28 one Dewey Roe, the driver
of a school bus, had an automobile liability policy with the plaintiff; to
this policy a school bus accident policy was attached as a rider, the
premium being paid by Roe. A pupil, while leaving the bus, was struck
by a car driven by defendant, and plaintiff, having paid the amount of
the accident policy to the estate of the deceased, seeks to recover this
sum from the defendant. No negligence was found on the part of Roe,
and payment was not made on the basis of the liability policy, but rather
on the coverage of the accident indorsement; in accident insurance there
is no subrogation, and the fact that the accident rider was attached to a
liability policy and was paid for by the driver offers no sufficient reason
for taking the case out of the rule. Since subrogation plays little part in
determining the premiums charged in insurance coverage and has been
(19z5); Sandcrs v. Frankfurt Al. A. & P. G. Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 485, 1o Am. St. Rep.
688, 57 AtI. 635 (1904).
: KULP, CASUALTY INS. (4 th Printing, 1939), p. 300. See this author for an interest-
ing account of all automobile coverage.
'Dazvies v. Maryland Casualty Co., 89 Wash. 57!, 154 Pac. iss6, L.R.A. 1916 D.
395 (i916).
' Allen & A. A. Renting Co. v. United Traction Co., 9! Misc. 531, 154 N.Y.S. 934
(19S,).2sSee note 17, sup~ra.
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termed a "windfall to the insurer,"'" it is submitted that the court was
correct in refusing to extend the doctrine of subrogation to cover this
situation. D.D.
INSURANCE - TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
IN LIFE INSURANCE
The insured had a policy of life insurance which provided for the
payment of disability benefits and waiver of premiums in the event he
"has become totally and permanently disabled and will for lifetime be
unable to perform any work or engage in any business for compensa-
tion or profit." He was afflicted with ulcers at the age of fifty-nine,
while employed as a roll-superintendent of a steel corporation. By reason
of the affliction he was confined to his bed for a number of months and
was only able to return as a watchman for three or four weeks and was
forced to discontinue this because of fatigue. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the Court of Appeals' and held that the provision would not be
taken literally, allowing the insured to recover benefits for total and
permanent disability.'
The use of the disability clause in life insurance is comparatively
new; the regular life companies did not adopt it generally until I907.3
The clause was added for a nominal cost and became a very good selling
point. However, its legal interpretation has caused a great deal of diffi-
culty and has been one of the major problems of life insurance compan-
ies.4 Unlike death, which is one of the most unequivocal of insured
events, or even fire which has only occasionally given rise to litigation,
total and permanent disability is not unambiguous and is capable of sev-
eral interpretations. If strictly interpreted it would seem to deny benefits
to all except the absolutely helpless.5 Such an interpretation would
2' PATTERSON, ESSENTIAL OF INS. LAW (1935), p. 122-Patterson weighs the necessity
for the doctrine of subrogation.
' Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 6z Ohio App. 280, 15 Ohio Op. 594,
23 N.E. (2d) 66z (938).
' Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Ohio St. 481, 2i N.E. (zd) 58S
('939).
'First policies (life) containing this clause appeared in Germany in 1876 and in
American Fraternal Orders in the following year. It appeared in regular life companies in
United States in 1896 but not generally till 1907 and thereafter. HUNTER, TOTAL AND
PERMANENT DISABILITY 1ENEFITS IN RELATION TO LIFE INSURANCE (19O) p. I.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. in 1896 was the first life company in United States to
adopt it. GEPIART, INSURANCE (1917) Vol. I, p. 174.
" Insurance company will also face other hazards. Insured may pretend to be more
seriously incapacitated than he really is and the prospect of a long rest at the expense of
the company may psychologically retard his recovery. Insured's mental attitude may pro-
long the insured event and continue physical disability. Insured's income also has a bearing
on these risks, if the amounts payable are comparable to or more than his earnings.
Ohio National Life Insurance Co. v. Stagner, 23! Ky. 275, 21 S.W. (zd) 289;
Prudential Insrance Co. v. South, 179 Ga. 653, 177 S.E. 499 (1934).
